End of this page section.

Begin of page section: Contents:

Prof. Wieland Müller

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1

1090 Wien

 

E-mail: wieland.mueller(at)univie.ac.at

http://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

 

Selected publications

  • Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon, Games and Economic Behavior 82, 2013, 658-674 (with Fangfang Tan)
  • Who is (More) Rational? American Economic Review, 104(6), 2014, 1518-1550 (with Syngjoo Choi, Shachar Kariv and Dan Silverman)
  • Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection, Games and Economic Behavior 74(1), 2012, 102-119 (with Michalis Drouvelis and Alex Possajennikov) 
  • Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab, Games and Economic Behavior 66(1), 2009, 373-393 (with Yossi Spiegel and Yaron Yehezkel)
  • Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison, Games and Economic Behavior 64(1), 2008, 219-236 (with Dorothea Kübler and Hans-Theo Normann)
  • The merger paradox and why aspiration levels let it fail in the laboratory, The Economic Journal 117(522), 2007, 1073-1095 (with Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad and Hans-Theo Normann)
  • Noisy leadership: An experimental approach, Games and Economic Behavior 57(1), 2006, 37-62 (with Werner Güth and Yossi Spiegel)
  • Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: An experimental study on forward induction, Games and Economic Behavior 51(1), 2005, 109-127 (with Steffen Huck)
  • To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets, Games and Economic Behavior 38(2), 2002, 240-264. (with Steffen Huck and Hans-Theo Normann)
  • Stackelberg beats Cournot: On collusion and efficiency in experimental markets, Economic Journal 111(474), 2001, 749-765. (with Steffen Huck and Hans-Theo Normann)
  • The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games, Games and Economic Behavior 37(1), 2001, 161-169. (with Werner Güth and Steffen Huck)
  • Perfect versus imperfect observability: An experimental test of Bagwell's result, Games and Economic Behavior 31(2), 2000, 174-190. (with Steffen Huck)

Contact

DART – Doctoral Program in Accounting, Reporting, and Taxation
Universitätsstraße 15/E4 A-8010 Graz
University of Graz, Center for Accounting Research Phone:+43 (0)316 380 - 7255

End of this page section.

Begin of page section: Additional information:

End of this page section.